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The stated goals of welfare reform are to increase work, reduce dependency on welfare, reduce births
outside marriage, and to increase the formation of two parent families.  However, welfare reform may
also have indirect impacts on health.  We provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the impacts
of welfare reform on health.  We illustrate the main findings from the literature by presenting estimates
of the impact of reform on health insurance, health utilization, and health status using data from five
state waiver experiments.  The most consistent finding is that welfare reform led to a reduction in health
insurance coverage.  The impacts on health care utilization and health status tend to be more mixed
and fewer are statistically significant.  While the results are not conclusive, they suggest that welfare-to-work
programs need not have large negative health effects.
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I.  Introduction  
  Beginning in the early 1990s, many states used waivers to reform their Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) programs.  This state experimentation resulted in landmark legislation 
which in 1996 eliminated AFDC and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  
TANF—like the earlier AFDC program—provides cash grants to low income families with children and 
is a key element of the nation’s economic safety net.  The roots of this reform lie in long time concern that 
AFDC led to reductions in work, decreases in marriage, and increases in nonmarital births among low 
income women. 
  The stated goals of welfare reform are to increase work, reduce dependency on welfare, reduce 
births outside marriage, and to increase the formation of two parent families.  Evaluating the impacts of 
state and federal welfare reform is the subject of a large and growing literature.
1  In this paper, we 
summarize what is known about the impacts of welfare reform on health insurance, health care utilization, 
and health status. 
  We begin, in the next section, with a description of the key policy changes over this period.  The 
central changes in the TANF program were aimed at increasing work and decreasing welfare dependence 
and include: work requirements, lifetime time limits, financial sanctions, and enhanced earnings 
disregards.
2  In section III, we outline the pathways by which welfare reform may affect health.  The 
direct pathway is through health insurance—reform leads to reductions in welfare participation which is 
expected to reduce health insurance coverage (employer-provided coverage may increase but by less than 
Medicaid coverage declines).  The other pathways are more indirect—for example welfare reform may 
impact families’ economic resources, time endowment, and levels of stress which may then affect health 
care utilization and health status.  
  The early studies on this issue documented very low rates of health insurance coverage following 
federal reform.  For example, Bowen Garrett and John Holahan (2000) found that one year after leaving 
welfare, one-half of women and almost one-third of children are uninsured.
3  This “leaver” analysis 
provides an important profile of the well-being of families departing the welfare rolls.  However, an  
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analysis of welfare leavers is not appropriate for identifying the impact of welfare reform on health 
insurance coverage.  This important identification issue is assessed more fully in section IV where we 
discuss the methodologies that have been used to estimate impacts of welfare reform.  
  In section V, we provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the impacts of welfare 
reform on health.  The literature includes nonexperimental estimates (typically state-panel models using 
variation in the timing and presence of reform across states) and experimental estimates (randomized 
experimental evaluations of state waiver programs).  To illustrate the main findings from the literature, in 
section VI we present estimates of the impact of reform on health insurance, health utilization, and health 
status using data from five state waiver experiments (Connecticut, Iowa, Florida, Minnesota, and 
Vermont).   As we discuss more fully below, only a limited number of states included health outcomes in 
their experimental evaluations. Thus, our results reflect the specific policies that were implemented by 
these states and do not necessarily reflect “average” TANF policies.  
  The findings from the literature, illustrated using our experimental treatment effects, show that 
welfare reform had modest and mixed impacts on health outcomes.  While the results from the waivers 
may not generalize to TANF, they suggest that welfare-to-work programs need not have large negative 
health effects.  The most consistent finding is that welfare reform led to a reduction in health insurance 
coverage, or at least no substantial increase.  For example, our analysis of the five waiver experiments 
show that if we normalize the impact by the control group means, we find that reform led to no impact on 
current coverage, or, in Connecticut a small increase, with the estimates ranging from -2 percent to 6 
percent.  Importantly, the range and magnitude of estimates both in the literature and in our exploratory 
analysis is far smaller than the large reductions in health insurance found in the early leaver studies.  The 
impacts on health care utilization and health status tend to be more mixed and fewer are statistically 
significant.  Some studies find evidence of a modest decrease in utilization and small changes in health 
behaviors.  Our findings based on the analysis of five waiver states suggest no consistent impact on 




II. Welfare Reform in the 1990s  
  Beginning in the early 1990s, many states were granted waivers to make changes to their AFDC 
programs.  About half of the states implemented some sort of welfare waiver between 1993 and 1995 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, DHHS, 2001).  Following this period of 
state experimentation, PRWORA was enacted in 1996, replacing AFDC with TANF.  PRWORA 
originally indicated that all states had to have their TANF programs in place and have implemented 
TANF by July 1, 1997, although subsequently this deadline was relaxed (Administration of Children and 
Families, DHHS, 2002).  All states implemented PRWORA in a seventeen month period between 
September 1996 and January 1998 (Gil Crouse, 1999; Administration for Children and Families, DHHS, 
1997). 
  The main goals of welfare reform are to increase work, reduce dependency on welfare, reduce 
births outside marriage, and to increase the formation of two parent families.  While waiver and TANF 
policies varied considerably across states, the reforms were generally welfare-tightening and pro-work.  
More specifically, the welfare-tightening elements of reform include work requirements, financial 
sanctions, time limits, family caps, and residency requirements.
4  The loosening aspects of reform include 
liberalized earnings disregards (which promote work by lowering the tax rate on earned income while on 
welfare), increased asset limits, increased transitional Medicaid coverage, and expanded welfare 
eligibility for two-parent families.  Importantly, welfare reform—either the goals or resulting policies—
had little directly to do with health or health insurance.  
  During this period of welfare reform, however, other policies were expanding public health 
insurance for low-income families. Historically, eligibility for Medicaid for the non-elderly and non-
disabled was tied directly to receipt of cash public assistance.  In particular, the AFDC income eligibility 
limits adopted by a state would also be used for Medicaid, and AFDC conferred automatic eligibility for 
Medicaid.  Thus, a family that received AFDC benefits would also be eligible for health insurance 
through Medicaid.  Conversely, if a family left AFDC, its members generally would lose Medicaid  
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coverage.
5  However, in a series of federal legislative acts beginning in 1984, states were required to 
expand Medicaid coverage for infants, children, and pregnant women beyond the AFDC income limits, 
leading to large increases in eligibility (Jonathan Gruber 1997).  These are known as the poverty-related 
or OBRA Medicaid expansions.  By 2001, these expansions mandated that all children in families with 
income up to the Federal poverty limit were eligible for Medicaid, provided they met other requirements. 
  PRWORA further weakened the link between AFDC and Medicaid by requiring states to cover 
any family that meets the pre-PRWORA AFDC income, resource, and family composition eligibility 
guidelines (Ron Haskins 2001).  This so-called 1931 program (named after the relevant section of the 
Social Security Act, as amended by PRWORA) also allowed states to expand eligibility for parents 
beyond the 1996 AFDC/Medicaid limits.  Anna Aizer and Jeffrey Grogger (2003) report that by 2001, 
about half the states had taken advantage of this program and expanded Medicaid access for parents 
above the welfare income cutoffs. PRWORA also contained language restricting immigrant access to 
means-tested transfer programs (including Medicaid).  As discussed in George Borjas (2003), many states 
responded by providing immigrant access to Medicaid using newly created, state-funded “fill-in” 
programs. 
  Lastly, in 1997, Congress established the State Children’s Health Insurance program (SCHIP), 
which allows states to provide public health insurance to children up to 200 percent of the poverty level 
(and subsequently to higher levels).
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III. Welfare Reform and Expected Impacts on Health 
  Despite the lack of a direct connection between welfare reform and health, there are many 
indirect pathways through which welfare reform may affect health outcomes.   
  First, welfare reform reduces welfare caseloads, leading to a decline in Medicaid coverage.  The 
AFDC caseload has declined more than 60 percent since its peak in 1994 (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2002).
7  During this time period, the number of nondisabled adults and children on 
Medicaid also fell.  Between 1995 and 1997, the number of nondisabled adults on Medicaid fell by 10.6  
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percent, with larger reductions among cash welfare recipients (Leighton Ku and Brian Bruen 1999).  The 
noncash-assistance Medicaid caseload (especially children), on the other hand, grew, reflecting the 
separation of AFDC eligibility from Medicaid eligibility described above. 
  This expected loss in public coverage may be offset by increased private coverage due to 
increases in mother’s employment or coverage from another family member (crowd-in).  However, these 
low-skill workers are likely to be employed in industry-occupation cells with traditionally low rates of 
employer-provided health insurance (Janet Currie and Aaron Yelowitz 2000).  In sum, the first prediction 
is that welfare reform should be associated with a decrease in Medicaid coverage, an increase in private 
insurance, and likely a decrease in overall insurance. 
  This pathway of decreased insurance coverage may lead to changes in health.  For example, a 
decline in insurance may lead to less health service utilization—for example less preventive care and 
prenatal care (Richard Nathan and Frank Thompson 1999).  This decline in health care utilization may 
subsequently impact health outcomes.  Importantly, there is an ongoing debate about the magnitude of the 
causal effects of health insurance coverage on health.  Most observational studies show a positive and 
significant association between health insurance and health. However, as summarized in the recent review 
by Helen Levy and David Meltzer (2004), these observational studies are limited due to issues with 
endogeneity and selection. Instead, they argue that the best evidence about a causal link between health 
insurance and health comes from the quasi-experimental analysis of government policy expansions and 
the RAND health insurance experiments.  These studies show a much weaker, but still generally positive, 
link between health insurance and health compared to the observational studies. The positive link is 
stronger for more vulnerable or disadvantaged populations.
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  Second, welfare reform may impact families’ economic resources.  While the evidence is less 
clear on this topic, research suggests that welfare reform has led to an overall increase in the incomes of 
low-skill families.
9  However, Marianne Bitler, Jonah Gelbach, and Hilary Hoynes (2006) find that 
reform has heterogeneous impacts across the income distribution, with some evidence of reductions at the  
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lowest income levels.  These changes in a family’s economic well-being could then have impacts on 
health care utilization and health status (as well as health insurance coverage). 
  Third, reform-induced increases in employment may lead to changes in a parent’s time 
endowment which in turn can affect choices about health care utilization, diet, and health (Steven Haider, 
Alison Jacknowitz, and Robert Schoeni 2003).  Fourth, welfare reform could lead to increases (or 
decreases) in stress, which in turn can affect health.  
  Discussion of these pathways illustrates that the impacts of welfare reform on health insurance 
coverage and health care utilization are more direct than the impacts on health status.  This interpretation 
is consistent with the health production model in Michael Grossman (2001).  In particular, health is a 
durable capital stock that will change slowly with investment (time, nutrition, exercise, health services).  
Health services, on the other hand, are investment goods consumed each period and therefore would be 
expected to change more quickly in response to changes in prices, income, and time constraints.  This has 
important implications for how to interpret and what to expect from empirical analyses of welfare reform 
on health. We might expect a somewhat immediate impact of reform on health insurance, while it may 
take months or years for welfare reform to impact health status.  We will return to this issue later in the 
chapter. 
 
IV. Empirical Identification of the Effects of Welfare Reform on Health  
  Three challenges to identifying the impact of TANF are often raised in the literature (Blank 
2001).  First, at the same time welfare reform was occurring, the U.S. economy boomed.  As documented 
in James Hines, Hoynes, and Alan Krueger (2001) the expansion of the 1990s led to important gains for 
disadvantaged families, especially in the last years of the decade.  For example, the unemployment rate 
for African-Americans fell to the lowest level ever recorded and low-skill groups experienced the first 
increase in real wages since the 1970s.  These gains in the economic position of disadvantaged families 
may, of course, have independent impacts on health.  Second, all states implemented TANF between 
September 1996 and January 1998.  This relatively short implementation period leaves less scope for  
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identifying impacts of TANF through differences in the timing of TANF implementation across states.  
Identifying the impacts of welfare waivers, however, is considerably more straightforward, as there is 
variation across states and over time in the implementation of waivers.  Third, welfare reform is multi-
dimensional and consists of many different policy changes.  In the end there is no single waiver program 
or TANF program—there are 50 state TANF programs, one in each state.  This makes it difficult to learn 
about the importance of any specific policy change.  
  In the face of these challenges, there are several different methodologies used in the literature.  
The first is experimental—by federal law all states implementing welfare waivers were required to 
evaluate their waivers, mostly using experimental methods.  In these experimental evaluations, 
individuals were randomly assigned into the treatment (welfare) and control (AFDC) groups.  Using the 
data from these experiments, the treatment effect of reform can be simply calculated as the difference 
between mean outcomes in the treatment and control groups.  Importantly, all experimental analyses 
relate to welfare waiver programs—there is no experimental evidence of the effects of state TANF 
programs.
10 
  The second approach is non-experimental.  One common approach is to estimate state panel 
models such as:  
yist = Rstβ + Xistδ + Lstα + γs + νt + εist. 
In this prototype model, the outcome variable is yist and the welfare reform variable is Rst.  The model also 
includes controls: state-level labor market and other policy variables (Lst), individual covariates Xist (if 
applicable), as well as state (γs) and time (νt) fixed effects.  In one common version of this model, Rst is a 
dummy variable equal to one if waivers and/or TANF are implemented in this state-year observation.  In 
this case, identification comes from variation in the presence and timing of reform across states.   
  Because of the lack of variation in the timing of TANF implementation across states, many 
studies extend the above model to a difference-in-difference model:  
yist = Rstβ1 + TREATist*Rst β2 + TREATist β3+ Xistδ + Lstα + γs + νt + εist.  
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The parameter of interest is now β2 and is identified using the difference in trends post-reform between 
the treatment and control groups.  Various comparisons are used in the literature including comparing 
single women with children to childless women, single women with children to married women with 
children, and low educated single women with children to highly educated single women with children.  
Other nonexperimental studies add variation in the waiver and TANF reform variables by using detailed 
characteristics across states such as the length of the time limit or the severity of the sanctions.   
  Another variation of the basic model above is to replace the reform variable Rst with a measure of 
the welfare caseload (or per capita caseload) in the state-year cell, Cst.  This approach seeks to take 
advantage of the variation in the declines in welfare caseloads across states and over time.  There are 
potential problems with interpreting such estimates as the effect of reform, however.  The literature has 
shown that welfare reform accounts for only part of the fall in caseloads—other important factors are 
labor market opportunities and other policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (examples of this 
literature include Council of Economic Advisors, 1997, 1999; Geoffrey Wallace and Blank, 1999; James 
Ziliak et al., 2000; and Jacob Klerman and Haider, 2004).
11   
  A third approach in the literature is a “leaver analysis”—consisting of national or state-level 
studies that examine the characteristics of families leaving welfare.  The leaver studies provide an 
accurate snapshot of the experiences of those families that have left welfare.  However, such studies 
cannot identify causal impacts of welfare reform (Blank 2002).  First, there is no way to identify why the 
families left welfare—was it due to welfare reform or other factors?  Second, a significant fraction of the 
decline in welfare caseloads is due to reductions in initial entry into welfare (Grogger et al., 2003) and the 
leaver studies could never capture this group.  Finally, there is no control group, no before period data, 
and no comparison to exits from welfare in the pre-reform period.   
  Overall, the experimental and nonexperimental approaches have advantages and disadvantages.  
Experimental studies have the appeal of random assignment, but have limitations such as the limited 
coverage of TANF policies (as opposed to waivers), the inability to obtain nationally representative 
estimates, and the inability to account for effects of changes in entry behavior that result from welfare  
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reform.  Further, as is often noted in discussions of experimental methods for evaluating the effects of 
programs, effects when a small scale program is ramped up to apply everywhere may differ from the 
experimental estimates.  Evaluators may be better funded or have a strong incentive to ensure program 
participants understand the rules of the treatment.  This may not be the case when the program is 
implemented everywhere.  Nonexperimental analyses have the advantage of being nationally 
representative, but the usual identification concerns exist—that underlying trends in the outcome 
variables of interest could lead to spurious estimates of policy effects. A further disadvantage of 
nonexperimental analyses, especially as it relates to health outcomes, is that one is limited by the 
available data at the state level.  A further advantage of the experimental analyses in the context of this 
study is that many state welfare waiver experiments collected data that allow for a somewhat richer 
analysis of health outcomes than would be possible with large survey sample data sets such as the Current 
Population Survey (CPS).  However, the small sample sizes in these surveys are a limitation relative to 
the large sample sizes in typical nonexperimental analyses. 
 
V. What Do We Know from the Existing Literature?  
  The literature on the impacts of welfare reform is quite large.  Here, we focus our review on what 
is known about the impacts of welfare reform on health.
12  Our review summarizes evidence from both 
experimental and nonexperimental analyses.  We organize our summary into two sections, the first 
examines the impacts of welfare reform on health insurance and the second examines the impacts of 
reform on health utilization and health status.   
  The nonexperimental literature utilizes national survey data that allows for identification of state-
year cells.  Such national datasets include the CPS, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), 
and Vital Statistics detailed natality files. The main source of data for experimental evaluations of welfare 
waivers is state administrative data.  These data, for example, are used to calculate impacts of reform on 
employment, earnings, welfare use, public assistance payments, and, in a few cases, Medicaid enrollment.  
Relevant for this project, however, these administrative data have (in some experiments) been augmented  
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by surveys of the treatment and control groups measuring additional family and child outcomes (including 
health insurance coverage, utilization, and status).  In addition to the state welfare experiments, we also 
draw on the experimental evaluation of the Canadian Self Sufficiency Project (SSP) which, like TANF, is 
an income support program with a time limit, which is considerably more generous than most of the U.S. 
experiments.  We discuss SSP’s impacts here for two reasons.  First, SSP was associated with larger cash 
increases during the treatment before time limits than were most of U.S. programs.  Also, the SSP data 
cover a longer follow-up period than the U.S. experimental data.  Both of these features may make 
possible detection of long term health effects of SSP if they exist.  
A. Health insurance coverage 
  Many studies examine the impacts of welfare reform on health insurance.  The studies analyze the 
impact of reform on public health insurance coverage (usually Medicaid), private health insurance 
coverage (such as employer-provided coverage or individually purchased coverage), and any insurance 
coverage.  The discussion above suggests that reform should lead to overall reductions in health 
insurance—through decreases in public coverage and increases in private coverage—as families move off 
welfare and into work.  We summarize the main findings of this literature. 
•  Welfare reform led to small reductions in health insurance coverage 
  The literature is generally consistent with the prediction that reform is associated with a reduction 
in health insurance coverage.  Among the nonexperimental studies, Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2005) 
use the BRFSS and find that state waivers and TANF implementation led to reductions in any insurance 
coverage for single women, with the largest impacts for Hispanic single women.  The study uses a state 
pooled panel model with dummies for waivers and TANF implementation and estimates a difference-in-
difference model (with married women as controls) to control for other contemporaneous impacts on 
health insurance.  John Cawley, Mathis Schroeder and Kosali Simon (2005) extend this work by 
examining effects of reform on monthly health insurance coverage using the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP).  They find an increase in the propensity to be uninsured, with somewhat 
smaller effects for children compared to their mothers. Robert Kaestner and Neeraj Kaushal (2004) use  
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the CPS to estimate a difference-in-difference model and find that declines in the AFDC caseload are 
associated with reductions in Medicaid, increases in employer-provided health insurance, and overall 
increases in uninsurance for single mothers and their children.  They measure welfare reform using the 
AFDC/TANF caseload—the idea being that reform leads to reductions in the caseload which leads to 
changes in health insurance (and other outcomes).  These estimates may reflect factors other than reform 
that are leading to changes in the caseload. 
  The results using household survey data are consistent with Medicaid caseload analyses.  Ku and 
Garrett (2000) examine the impact of pre-PRWORA welfare waivers on Medicaid caseloads and find that 
waivers led to (statistically insignificant) declines in the adult and child Medicaid caseload.  
  Grogger, Klerman, and Karoly (2002) review the experimental literature and find small, typically 
insignificant, and somewhat mixed impacts of welfare reform on the health insurance coverage of adult 
recipients and their children.  In these studies, surveys are used to measure health insurance coverage at 
some point after random assignment (typically three to four years, depending on the particular study).   
  In contrast to the above studies, Thomas DeLeire et al., (Forthcoming) conclude that welfare 
reform leads to increases in health insurance coverage for low educated women.  They use the CPS and 
examine the impacts of waiver and TANF implementation and argue that reform could lead to increases 
in insurance if there are spillover effects of reform on nonrecipients.  Indeed, because of these possible 
spillovers they consider the “treatment” group to be all women regardless of marriage or presence of 
children.
13 
  Overall, while the literature is somewhat mixed, the balance of evidence is toward finding 
decreases in insurance following reform.  It is difficult to compare specific estimates across the studies—
due to different measurement of public coverage (Medicaid or any public insurance) and differences in 
samples and control groups—but consistently the measured impacts are relatively small.  For example, 
Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2005) find that TANF led to an insignificant 4 percentage point reduction in 
insurance coverage among low educated single women with children.  This is in stark contrast to the very 
large rates of uninsurance reported in the leaver studies (for example, Garrett and Holahan, 2000).  As  
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discussed above, leaver studies are not useful for estimating the impacts of the policy change that is the 
focus of this study..  
•  Concurrent Medicaid expansions mitigated these declines in insurance coverage 
  Borjas (2003) and Heather Royer (2003) find that more restrictive Medicaid policies did not 
reduce health insurance coverage among immigrants, because the loss in public coverage was offset by 
increases in private insurance coverage.
14  Anna Aizer and Grogger (2003) and Susan Busch and Noelia 
Duchovny (2003) use the CPS to examine parental Medicaid expansions through the 1931 program.  
Aizer and Grogger (2003) find that these Medicaid expansions led to increases in health insurance 
coverage of women (with some crowd-out of private insurance coverage).  They also find that expanding 
parental coverage leads to increases in the health insurance coverage of children—possibly arising from 
an increase in benefits relative to costs associated with taking up coverage.   
B. Health utilization and health outcomes 
  The BRFSS allow for measures of utilization (indicators for recent checkups, Pap smears, breast 
exams, and whether one needed care but found it unaffordable), health behaviors (smoking, drinking, and 
exercise), and health status (obesity, lost work days, and self reported health status).  Another source of 
nonexperimental data is the detailed natality files—which as a census of birth certificates includes data on 
prenatal care and birth outcomes (birth weight, gestation).  Many state waiver experiments include 
surveys designed to obtain richer family and child outcomes.   
•  Welfare reform had small, mixed impacts on health care utilization and outcomes 
  The nonexperimental literature finds small, mixed and often insignificant impacts on health.  
Currie and Grogger (2002) and Kaestner and Won Lee (Forthcoming) use the detailed natality data and 
find that declines in welfare caseloads during the waiver period (Currie and Grogger) and TANF period 
(Kaestner and Lee) are associated with declines in prenatal care and small increases in the incidence of 
low birth weight for low-education women.  
  Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2005) use the BRFSS and find significant but small reductions in 
health care utilization such as the probability of having gotten a checkup, Pap smear, or breast exam in the  
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last year.  They also find (insignificant) increases in the likelihood of needing care but finding if 
unaffordable.  Kaestner and Elizabeth Tarlov (2006) also use the BRFSS and find no association between 
reductions in welfare caseloads and health behaviors (smoking, drinking, diet, and exercise) and health 
status (weight, days in poor health, and general health status). 
  The experimental estimates of the impact of reform on health are summarized in several reviews 
including Grogger and Karoly (2005); Grogger et al., (2001); Pamela Morris et al., (2001); and Lisa 
Gennetian et al., (2002).  (Estimates are also available from the final reports for each state’s evaluation.)  
Much of the experimental evidence examines impacts on children ages five to twelve.
15 Health utilization 
measures include when the child last saw a dentist or doctor, whether any children have had ER visits 
since random assignment, whether the child has a place to go for routine care, and whether various types 
of medical care were unaffordable.  Health outcomes include parent-rated child general health status as 
well as indices of maternal depression and child behavior problems.  The estimates from these child 
surveys are mixed, with an equal number of unfavorable and favorable impacts of reform on health 
(Grogger and Karoly, 2005).  The Canadian SSP study examines somewhat different outcomes, focusing 
on injuries, long term health limitations, parent’s emotional well-being and general health.  The impacts 
of SSP are quite consistently positive, but few are statistically significant. 
•  There is some evidence that the impacts varied across groups and with different types of welfare 
reform 
 
  Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2005) find that the negative impacts of reform on health insurance 
and outcomes are larger for Hispanics.  This would be as expected if a large share of Hispanics were 
affected by the immigrant provisions of PRWORA or were deterred from applying for public insurance 
by concerns about program use affecting eventual citizenship or permanent residency applications.  
Borjas (2003) finds, using a differences-in-differences-in-differences strategy, that reform was associated 
with a decrease in the share of immigrants with public coverage, offset by an increase in private coverage.  
  The experimental studies of child well-being find that any improvements in behaviors tend to be 
concentrated among young children while there are more likely to be negative impacts on behaviors for 
adolescent children (Morris et al., 2001 and Gennetian et al., 2002).  The experimental literature also  
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finds that improvements are more likely to be present with welfare reforms that lead to increases in 
income (such as those with generous earnings disregards).  Examples of more generous reforms include 
the state reforms in Connecticut and Minnesota, as well as the Canadian SSP program. We will discuss 
this more in the next section.  
 
VI. Illustrating Impacts of Reform from Experimental Data 
  Overall, the summary of the literature above suggests that welfare reform most likely led to 
decreases in insurance with more mixed evidence for health utilization and health outcomes.  Here we 
explore these findings by presenting estimates on the impact of reform from five state welfare waiver 
evaluations.  As discussed above, each state waiver (but no TANF program) was evaluated using 
randomized experiments.  Further, state waivers varied significantly in terms of their policy scope and 
many of the state waivers did not include time limits or enhanced earnings disregards (two of the key 
policies included in TANF).   
  Here, we analyze public-use data from state waiver experiments in five states: Connecticut, 
Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, and Vermont.  The primary reason why we chose these states was that they 
were among a relatively small number of states whose evaluations include data on health.  Most state 
evaluations relied on administrative data on employment and welfare participation while these five states 
(and a few others) supplemented this administrative data by fielding a survey to a subset of treatment and 
control participants. This is the main source of data used for the literature on family and child well-being 
(Gennetian et al., 2002; Morris et al., 2001).  We chose to include Connecticut and Florida in particular 
because they included time limits as part of their waiver experiments.  Overall, these five states provide a 
nice range of welfare reform policies—from more generous (Connecticut, Minnesota) to less generous 
(Florida, Vermont), including states with time limits (Connecticut, Florida) and without time limits (Iowa, 
Minnesota, Vermont).  This is useful for evaluating alternative sorts of welfare reforms. However, they 
are less useful purely as a TANF evaluation exercise.    
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  Below we describe the five state’s policies and experimental data in more detail.  We then present 
the estimates of the effects of the policy changes on health insurance, health utilization, and health status. 
 
A. Description of the Policies in the Five States 
  Table 1 presents the policies for the welfare waivers in the five states and AFDC (which is the 
control group program in each case).  We document three central policies that are required in TANF 
programs:  time limits, work requirements, and financial sanctions.  We also include earnings disregards 
as quite commonly they are made more generous in TANF programs and they are very important for 
determining how reform affects family income.   
  Very few welfare waivers included time limits.  In our set of states, Connecticut’s Jobs First (CT-
JF) and Florida’s Family Transition Program (FL-FTP) have time limits.  There were some other states 
that included time limits, one of which (Indiana) had public-use data available, but we excluded Indiana’s 
reform due to limited data on health outcomes.  All of the state waivers had work requirements that were 
stricter than the pre-existing AFDC program.  The states varied in terms of who was exempt from work 
requirements (typically, this is based on the age of the youngest child in the family) and whether the 
program was focused on employment (had a “work first” policy) or aimed recipients towards education 
and training. 
  The earnings disregards determine the rate at which benefits are reduced as earnings increase.  In 
the AFDC program, after three months all earnings over a basic deduction level were “taxed” at 100 
percent.  This high benefit reduction rate played a central role in the adverse work incentives in the pre-
reform system. All of the states (except Vermont—VT-WRP) had more generous disregard policies than 
did AFDC.  The most generous states in our sample are CT-JF (where all earnings below the poverty line 
were disregarded) and Minnesota (MN-MFIP).  FL-FTP and Iowa (IA-FIP) had somewhat less generous 
reforms.  Highlighting the earnings disregards is important because this liberalization leads not only to 
increases in benefits, but also to an increase in the breakeven income point which implies increases in 
welfare participation (at least before time limits hit). Thus, we have an opposite prediction for the effects  
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of reform in the short run compared to our long run prediction of reform causing a decrease in welfare 
participation. 
  Financial sanctions (which are triggered when a client does not comply with the work 
requirements or other rules) also varied across the states, with the most stringent policy in FL-FTP.  
Finally, the pre-existing AFDC policy provided twelve months of transitional Medicaid assistance to 
families leaving welfare.  This was expanded by CT-JF (to two years) and VT-WRP (to three years).   
The final row of the table shows how the states vary in terms of the level of the maximum welfare grant at 
the time of random assignment.  Florida and Iowa have less generous maximum grants while 
Connecticut’s and Vermont’s grants are quite generous. 
  The experiments in VT-WRP and MN-MFIP had two treatments—incentives only and full 
treatment.  The incentives-only policies included the enhanced earnings disregards but not the work 
requirements.  In our analysis below, we analyze both treatments in MN-MFIP but present the full 
treatment only for VT-WRP.  (The Vermont incentives-only program was only mildly more generous 
than the preexisting AFDC program, and thus would not be expected to have significantly different 
impacts than AFDC.).  Also important to note, FL-FTP had a two-tiered policy that assigned one 
treatment to the “job ready” (which included a shorter time limit and a work first employment program) 
and another to the “non job ready” (which included a longer time limit and more emphasis on education 
and training).  We evaluate the average treatment effect across both FL-FTP groups.  
  Overall, CT-JF and FL-FTP are the most “TANF like” of the reform states, due to the presence of 
the time limit.  CT-JF and MN-MFIP are states whose waivers were most likely to lead to increases in 
income and welfare use (at least before time limits bind in CT-JF) due to the enhanced earnings 
disregards.  VT-WRP was probably the most “gentle” of the reforms with a weaker work requirement, no 
time limit, and the longest transitional Medicaid benefits.  Again, we repeat the caveat above—these 




B. Description of evaluations and our samples in the five states 
  Table 2 describes the details of each of the five experiments and the samples that we use in our 
analysis.  We begin with the timing of the experiment (random assignment and follow up period), the 
geographic range of the experiment (state-wide or partial state), and the sample size for the single-parent 
component of the evaluation (used in the final reports in each state).  Most of the state caseloads consist 
primarily of single-parent families and this is reflected in the evaluations that also primarily focus on 
single-parent families. 
  All of the impacts on health come from the surveys which are given to a (random) subset of the 
full sample.
16  We indicate in table 2 the timing of the surveys, the cohorts that faced the surveys, and the 
response rate on the surveys.  The surveys tend to be fielded to specific cohorts between three and four 
years after random assignment.  For example, in CT-JF there is survey data on 2,424 single-parent 
recipients who entered the experiment between April 1996 and February 1997.  This number is a bit more 
than half of the full sample size for the evaluation.  The information on health comes from the adult 
survey and the focal child survey (with the exception being VT-WRP which does not have a focal child 
survey).  The focal child is one child who is between the ages of five and twelve at the time of the survey.  
Only one child is chosen (randomly if there is more than one child of the correct age) and there is no child 
survey information if there is no child in that age range.  That explains why the number of observations 
for the child survey is less than the number for the adult survey.
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  It is important to note the timing of the survey (at three to four years after random assignment) is 
rather medium term.  First, we might not expect much to happen until after the time limits which in the 
case of Florida (and to a lesser extent Connecticut) are first reached close to the survey dates.  Further, to 
comprehensively understand the impact of welfare reform on health status, we need to use data that span a 
very long follow up period (which these surveys do not).  On the other hand, we may expect that health 
insurance (and probably health care utilization) will respond more immediately.  However, because 
several of these states included expansions in transitional Medicaid assistance, the expansions may 
dampen any negative impacts on health insurance.   
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  We also indicate in the table the samples that we use in our analysis.  We have focused on 
samples of single parents (at the time of random assignment).
18  For some states, this is simply the full 
sample (CT-JF and FL-FTP), as the public-use data are only for single parents.  In MN-MFIP, we present 
estimates for long-term single parent welfare recipients living in urban counties.  This is the group that 
was highlighted in the state’s final report.
19  Because we consider both incentives only and full treatment 
in MN-MFIP, we report sample sizes for both treatments.  We have chosen our IA-FIP sample to include 
single females in early cohorts.
20  Finally, for VT-WRP, we include only those receiving the “full” 
treatment. 
 
C.  Results 
  We present our results in six figures.  In each case we present an unconditional “percent effect” 
estimator which is simply 100 times the treatment group mean minus the control group mean divided by 
the control group mean.  This is weighted to be representative of the full experimental population at that 
point in time where sampling probabilities varied (for Connecticut, Iowa, and Minnesota).  An alternative 
estimator, used often in the evaluation literature, is the standardized “effect size” which is the treatment 
mean minus the control mean divided by the standard deviation of the control group.  For those who 
prefer that measure, we have companion appendix tables for each of the figures that present the effect size 
(as well as the difference, standard error of the difference [calculated to be robust to heteroskedasticity], 
the control group mean, and the number of observations).  Note that in our experiment, there is no need to 
differentiate between intent to treat and average treatment effects.  Everyone in the treatment group is 
treated—everyone faces the new welfare reform program.  This is in contrast to, for example, the Moving 
to Opportunity Program where the treatment is voluntary (Jeffrey Kling et al., forthcoming).
21  
  To begin, figure 1 presents the impacts of welfare reform on quarterly employment, quarterly 
welfare participation, and quarterly income.  These estimates are important “first stage” outcomes.  For 
example, we may expect states with smaller reductions in welfare participation to have smaller reductions 
in health insurance coverage.  Treatment group members in states whose reforms led to large increases in  
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income may show fewer adverse or more beneficial health outcomes compared to treatment group 
members in states whose reforms led to decreases in income.   
  Figure 1 presents these first stage outcomes measured at the quarter that the survey was fielded 
(outcomes not available for Iowa). The companion table is Appendix table 1.  Information about 
employment and welfare participation at the time of the survey may present an incomplete picture of 
these important first stage outcomes. For example, it may be important to know about longer term welfare 
and employment exposure to understand impacts on health measured at the time of the survey.  Figure 2 
provides a more comprehensive characterization of these impacts by presenting differences (between the 
treatment and control groups) in the outcomes averaged over all quarters between random assignment and 
the time of the survey.  The companion table is Appendix table 2.  While an argument could be made in 
support of either time frame, we focus on the entire period up to the survey to reflect the fact that the 
health care utilization data refer to some look-back period and the health status variables are stock 
measures that adjust over a longer time period. 
  Figures 1 and 2 consist of three panels, where each panel corresponds to a different outcome: 
quarterly employment, welfare participation, and income (earnings plus cash assistance plus food stamps 
plus General Assistance for MN-MFIP only). Within each panel, we present percent effects for each of 
the states where the outcome is available.  There are a maximum of six estimates—one each for CT-JF, 
FL-FTP, IA-FIP, and VT-WRP and two for MN-MFIP (incentives only treatment and full treatment).  
Each estimate is shown as a bar, and at the end of the bar we provide the percent effect along with the 
significance of the treatment control differences (* denotes significant at the 10 percent level, ** 
significant at the 5 percent level, and *** significant at the 1 percent level).  Later figures differ only in 
how many panels are presented.  The sample for the estimates in figures 1 and 2 is persons completing the 
survey who also have administrative data for all three outcomes.
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  The results for figure 1 show that at the time of the survey, employment is higher in all states, 
with significant increases in CT-JF, VT-WRP and MFIP-Full.  Welfare participation is significantly lower  
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in CT-JF and FL-FTP, reflecting the post-time limit period. MFIP shows higher welfare participation and 
higher income, reflecting the generous reform without time limits.   
  The results for figure 2, reflecting the average impact during the period between random 
assignment and the survey, show that all of the programs led to statistically significant increases in 
quarterly employment relative to AFDC.  Effects on employment seem to be larger in the states with more 
generous earnings disregards (MN-MFIP, CT-JF).  Welfare participation is significantly higher than 
under AFDC in Minnesota and somewhat higher in Connecticut, reflecting their more generous disregards 
and (in the case of CT-JF) the fact that more of the period was pre-time limits.  Welfare participation is 
significantly lower with FL-FTP.
23  Finally, Panel C presents impacts on quarterly income from 
administrative sources (earnings plus cash welfare plus food stamps plus General Assistance for MN-
MFIP only).  Total quarterly income was significantly higher for the treatment group members in 
Connecticut and Minnesota, and about the same for the other states.   
  These findings may suggest various patterns for the impacts on health insurance coverage, health 
care utilization, and health status, depending on the importance of the various pathways for reform to 
affect these outcomes.  For example, if the most important factor leading to public insurance coverage is 
ongoing welfare participation, figures 1 and 2 suggest that we would find increases in coverage with 
reform for Minnesota and possibly Connecticut.  If, instead, employment is important, it has other 
implications.  We should point out again, that increases in welfare participation are not generally expected 
with TANF.  This difference in welfare participation in the experiments compared with what we expect 
from TANF reflects the fact that only two of our states have time limits and Connecticut (being one of 
those two states) is highly unusual in its generous earnings disregard and extension of the transitional 
Medicaid benefits. For those readers most interested in evaluating TANF, the results for FL-FTP are the 
most relevant. 
  Figure 3 presents the estimates of the effect of reform on the head’s health insurance coverage.
24  
Reform led to increases in public insurance coverage in MN-MFIP and CT-JF—this seems to be a direct 
result of longer stays on welfare (figure 2).  Public insurance coverage fell (though not significantly) in  
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the other states.  Having other nonpublic (private) insurance and no public insurance shows the opposite 
pattern.  In both cases, MN-MFIP full treatment leads to larger (in magnitude) impacts, consistent with 
the larger first stage effects discussed above.  The bottom line is that reform leads to an increase in head’s 
overall insurance coverage in CT-JF, an insignificant increase for MFIP, and negative, small, and 
insignificant effects for the other states.  One interesting outcome available in some states is the presence 
of spells of uninsurance since random assignment.  This shows large and significant decreases (a positive 
outcome) for Minnesota, perhaps reflecting increased welfare participation (figures 1 and 2). 
  The results for children’s insurance coverage, presented in figure 4, show small (1 to 2 percent) 
and insignificant impacts on any insurance coverage.  Similar to the results for adults, any insurance and 
public insurance coverage increase for CT-JF and MN-MFIP (and IA-FIP) and decrease for the other 
states (VT-WRO and FL-FTP), although the effects are smaller and fewer are significant compared to the 
adults.  We would expect smaller impacts on child coverage given the other available public insurance 
programs.
25  Again, the measure of any spells of uninsurance for any child shows positive effects for 
Minnesota (negative estimates).  
  Figure 5 presents estimates for utilization, access, and affordability of care for the sample of focal 
children five to twelve (and for their families for doctor or dentist care being unaffordable).  These results 
are very inconclusive.  Few of the estimates are significant and for most variables there are an equal 
number of positive and negative estimates.  For example, the variable “focal child has seen a doctor in the 
past two years” has one significant positive estimate, with the rest insignificant and very close to zero.  
There are some large negative estimates for the outcome “someone in the family could not afford to see a 
dentist or doctor”—however none of these are significant.  Further, one might expect smaller decreases 
(or increases) in utilization in states that had smaller decreases (or increases) in insurance. No such 
pattern emerges from this figure. 
  Finally, figure 6 presents the results for health outcomes for the focal child sample including 
mother’s risk for depression (a positive effect is an adverse impact), child’s having behavioral problems 
(a positive effect is an adverse impact), and for the parent reporting the child was in excellent or very  
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good health (a positive effect is a good outcome).
26  These estimates consistently point to welfare reform 
leading to improvements in health status, although few estimates are statistically significant.  For 
example, four of five estimates indicate that the risk of maternal depression decreases (the exception is 
CT-JF), four of five estimates indicate that the child behavior index improves (the exception is FL-FTP), 
and three of five estimates indicate that child health status improves (the exceptions are IA-FIP and MN-
MFIP full treatment).  Again, the improvements tend to be most systematic for the most generous 
reforms: Minnesota has the largest improvements (perhaps related to their large increases in income) with 
Connecticut close behind.  
  Given that we estimate effects for many outcomes, we need to be concerned about the possibility 
that the separate tests are sometimes wrongly rejecting the null of no impact.  To address this concern 
about multiple inference, we have also constructed summary measures for the types of outcomes within 
each table for each state which allow us to test the effect of the treatment on each set of outcomes.  For 
each set of outcomes (for example, quarterly employment, welfare receipt, and income since random 
assignment for figure 2), the summary measure is defined as the average of the standardized outcomes 
(after having converted all outcomes to be positive when they are good and normalizing them by the 
control group standard deviation).  So, for the example, the summary measure would be the average of the 
quarterly employment, quarterly income, and 1 minus quarterly welfare receipt (assuming, as per the 
intent of reform, that ongoing welfare receipt is a negative thing), each normalized by its control group 
standard deviation.  This new averaged variable is then regressed on treatment status for each state.  Tests 
on this summary measure are then robust to over-testing.   
  This does not entirely resolve the issue of multiple inference as there are still five such summary 
measures.  It is important to consider hypotheses about these summary measures as members of families 
of hypotheses.  This involved calculating cutoffs for test statistics such that the probability is less than a 
set amount (say 0.05) that at least one of the tests in the family would exceed the cutoff under a joint null 
of no effects.  A familiar but quite conservative such test (if the test statistics are highly correlated) is the 
Bonferroni adjustment, in which the adjusted p-value is the observed p-value times the number of  
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outcomes examined. More powerful tests remove hypotheses from the family of nulls if they are rejected.  
An alternative from the biostatistics literature used in recent papers by Kling and Jeffrey Liebman (2004), 
Kling, Liebman, and Larry Katz (Forthcoming), and Michael Anderson (2005) involves calculating 
family-wise error adjusted significance levels, using the Westfall and Young free step-down resampling 
method (Peter Westfall and Stanley Young, 1993).  We have also implemented this method to adjust our 
summary measure p-values for the multiple inference, using 1000 draws from the null distribution of no 
impact of each summary measure (for more details, see algorithm 2.8 in Westfall and Young, 1993).     
  We now discuss the results of our five summary measures for each of the states, reported in 
Appendix table 6.  The table reports the treatment-control difference in summary measures for each 
state/treatment and figure, along with the standard error, the family-wise error adjusted p-values for each 
state/treatment, and the N for each summary measure.
27  Each summary measure is for a single table and 
state/treatment, and averages all (normalized) reported outcomes for that treatment.  The normalized 
outcomes are then all for positive outcomes (so the summary measure treatment-control difference is 
positive if the reform caused an improvement in the summary measure).  For the employment, welfare, 
and income summary measure (figure 2), lack of welfare receipt is considered “good.”  For the adult and 
child/family health insurance coverage summary measures (figures 3 and 4), public coverage and lacking 
any spells of coverage are considered “good.”  For the health care utilization summary measure (figure 5), 
not having been unable to afford to see the doctor or dentist is considered good.  Finally, for the health 
status summary measure (figure 6), the child’s mother not being at risk for depression and the child not 
having a high Behavioral Problem Index measure are considered “good.”   
  Adjusting for the family-wise error rate definitely makes a difference in the overall interpretation 
of the results.  For example, for the figure 2 summary measure (panel A of Appendix table 7), the 
treatment-control differences for IA-FIP, MN-MFIP full, FL-FTP, and CT-JF are all positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level if the p-value is unadjusted for the multiple testing (significance levels 
not shown in table).  However, when multiple inference has been controlled for, only FL-FTP and CT-JF 
have significant treatment-control differences in the summary measure, and only Florida’s is significant at  
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the 5 percent level.  For the adult health insurance measures in figure 3, the summary measure treatment-
control difference is only statistically significant for CT-JF (and it is positive, suggesting an improvement 
in health insurance coverage for the head).  None of the child/family health insurance summary measures 
(figure 4) are significant, although both the MN-MFIP incentives only and CT-JF measures are both 
positive and come close to statistical significance (p=0.107 and 0.103 respectively).  Again, none of the 
figure 5 or figure 6 summary measure treatment-control differences are statistically significant, although 
all but one are positive.  Thus, considering all the measures within each domain suggests a similar 
interpretation to the one we have from considering them one at a time.  CT-JF had a positive and 
significant effect on income, employment, and leaving welfare and also on better adult insurance 
coverage outcomes.  Effects for child/family insurance, utilization, and health status are small and 
insignificant in general. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
  This paper explores the relationship between welfare reform and health.  We examine both state 
welfare waivers and TANF implementation. We first present a comprehensive review of the literature and 
summarize what is known about impacts of welfare reform on health insurance coverage, health care 
utilization, and health status.  There is a growing literature on this subject, although there are few clear 
findings.  Most studies find that welfare reform leads to reductions in health insurance coverage, although 
some studies find the opposite.  Results for utilization and health status fairly consistently find negative 
impacts but the estimates are very small and rarely statistically significant.  
  We then go on to present estimates from five experimental evaluations of state welfare waivers.  
We present percent effects—100 times the difference in means between the treatment and control group 
divided by the control group mean.  Given the random assignment to the treatment and control groups, 
this is an unbiased estimate of the effects of welfare reform.  Overall, the results suggest that reform leads 
to small changes in health insurance and possible improvements in health. The results for health 
utilization are less conclusive.    
25 
  Our choice of these five states (Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, and Vermont) is driven 
primarily by data availability.  Most state welfare experiments collected data on employment and welfare 
use, but relatively few provided the data on health needed for this study.  Further, states were required by 
law to provide experimental evaluations of their waiver programs yet TANF imposed no such 
requirement.  As a consequence, while these five state’s waivers are representative of all waiver 
programs, they are not necessarily representative of TANF programs.  Only two of these states have time 
limits (Connecticut and Florida).  Two (Connecticut and Minnesota) had very large expansions in their 
earning disregards which led to increases in benefits and welfare participation (at least prior to reaching 
the time limits).  An advantage of using data from these states is that their welfare policies span a wide 
range of the policy space.  A disadvantage is that they are not ideal if the goal is a pure TANF evaluation.  
We had little choice in this selection, however, as there is no experimental data for TANF, or public-use 
data for many states.  
  With this caveat, we have several important conclusions from our analysis of the experimental 
data and our reading of the broader literature.  First, work promoting reforms do not necessarily lead to 
bad outcomes.  There is little evidence that reforms led to significant reductions in health care utilization 
or worse health.  Second and somewhat more speculatively, the type of welfare reform likely matters.  
Reforms that encouraged work while increasing benefits (as in Minnesota or Connecticut) even in the 
presence of work requirements and time limits may lead to more consistent positive impacts on health.  
Finally, investments in data collection resulted in important increases in our knowledge. Our analysis (and 
the analyses by many others) could not have been done without the randomized experimental data and the 
additional resources spent on surveys that provide a rich set of health, education and well-being 
outcomes.   
  We have much left to learn about the impacts of welfare reform on health.  Many health outcomes 
may require a longer follow up period to be fully evaluated. The study here is at best a short- to medium-
term analysis and thus may be too early to inform us about the full impacts of reform. However, we need 
the appropriate data in order to complete this task. For example, one could field follow up surveys to  
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these experimental samples. There are other ways to improve access to data that facilitate both 
experimental and nonexperimental research. There are limited options for using household survey data to 
estimate the impacts of a state varying policy such as welfare reform. The CPS is an option, but it only 
provides information on health insurance and (in some years) health status.  The SIPP has richer 
outcomes but smaller samples and no SIPP panel spanned key reform periods.  National Health Insurance 
Survey data are the obvious choice, but despite sample sizes comparable to the CPS, the public use 
version of the NHIS data does not identify individual states.  The BRFSS is another possibility, but the 
samples are smaller, and there is no coverage for children.  Non-health surveys need to be expanded to 
include more health outcomes, and even some health surveys might benefit from expanding the 
population surveyed or including health outcomes that might respond to shorter-run changes in income, 
employment, or program participation.  An example of the underlying demand for large scale survey data 
with state identifiers and health outcomes is evidenced by the explosion of studies that use vital statistics 
natality data on births in the U.S.  The rich natality data permits analysis of gestation, birth outcomes, and 
prenatal care and identify states and counties.  Finally, it would be useful for experimental evaluators to 
provide researchers with links to administrative data on Medicaid claims.  This would enable a richer 
characterization of health utilization and, possibly, health conditions.  
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1 For example, see comprehensive reviews by Rebecca Blank (2002) and Jeffrey Grogger and Lynn 
Karoly (2005). 
2 The new welfare programs include other changes which we document in section II.  Especially relevant 
for health, many states expanded “transitional” Medicaid coverage which is received when leaving 
welfare.  
3 Other leaver studies documented similar rates of coverage (Marilyn Ellwood and Kimball Lewis 1999; 
Jocelyn Guyer 2000; Robert Moffitt and Eric Slade 1997; Harold Pollack et al., 2002).  
4 Family caps prevent welfare benefits from increasing when a woman gives birth while receiving aid. 
Residency-requirement policies mandate that unmarried teen parents who receive aid must live in the 
household of a parent or other guardian. 
5 States could and did set up Medically Needy programs that allowed states to provide Medicaid benefits 
to families above the AFDC income cutoff if they had high medical expenses. States were also required to 
provide transitional Medicaid coverage for families leaving AFDC due to an increase in earnings. 
6 We will not discuss the literature on the effects of SCHIP, but its existence makes it more difficult to 
assess the impacts of reforms for coverage of children using nonexperimental data spanning the period 
after SCHIP was implemented. 
7 The literature on welfare reform includes an ongoing debate on what has contributed to this decrease in 
the welfare caseload.  The leading candidate besides welfare reform itself is the booming economy of the 
late 1990s.  Teen pregnancy rates also began to fall before TANF implementation. 
8 For example, Janet Currie and Jonathan Gruber found that expansions in Medicaid are associated with 
increased utilization and health outcomes among the poor (Currie and Gruber 1996a, 1996b) and David 
Card, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas (2006) found that the introduction of Medicare led to increases 
in insurance coverage and utilization, with larger impacts for more disadvantaged groups.  
9 For recent summaries of the experimental and nonexperimental studies of welfare reform and family 
income, see the reviews by Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005), and Moﬃtt (2002).  
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10 There are states that adopted their waiver programs as their TANF programs, when federal law was 
passed.  Therefore some of the welfare waiver experimental studies do, then, estimate impacts of TANF. 
11 Another possible problem with using caseloads to identify the causal impact of reform on other 
outcomes is that the caseload and the outcomes of interest may themselves be affected by unobserved 
factors. 
12 We focus here on the impacts of welfare reform on health.  A related literature finds that pre-reform 
public assistance programs lead to improvements in health.  Currie and Nancy Cole (1993) find that 
AFDC participation leads to improvements in birth outcomes (higher birth weight).  Currie and Grogger 
(2002) find that higher pre-PRWORA welfare participation rates are associated with more prenatal care 
and improved birth outcomes.  Price Fishback et al., (2005) find that increases in public assistance 
spending during the New Deal led to lower infant mortality, lower suicide rates, fewer deaths from 
diarrhea and infectious diseases, and higher birth rates.   
13 Large spillover effects seem to be inconsistent with the small estimated impacts of welfare reform on 
marriage and fertility (see, for example, Bitler et al., 2004; and the review in Grogger and Karoly, 2005). 
14 Royer also examines impact on pregnant immigrants and finds a temporary reduction in prenatal care 
but no effect on birth outcomes. 
15 DHHS funded a number of state experimental evaluations to allow them to examine longer run impacts 
of reform on various school and health outcomes for children who were 2–9 at the time of random 
assignment, and thus approximately 5–12 at the time of the surveys. 
16 In states conducting the focal-child evaluations, single parents with children of the appropriate age were 
oversampled for the adult survey as well.  The data for these states include sample weights to make the 
survey data representative of the overall population in the survey (these weights adjust for initial 
differences in sampling ratios for Connecticut, Iowa, and Minnesota). 
17 The table mentions the maximum number of available observations.  Because of item non-response, the 
actual Ns are lower than this for many outcomes.  We chose to use a different number of observations for 
each outcome to maximize sample.  Item non-response is generally low for most of our outcomes.  
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18 Some of the evaluations do not include data for two-parent families.  We wanted a sample that was 
consistent across states to the extent possible. 
19 It also has the advantage that there were no changes in the random assignment ratios across the time 
period, mitigating the need for controls beyond the treatment indicator.  Long term recipients are those on 
welfare for at least 24 of the past 36 months.  
20 To be precise, we include single females 18 and up or 16–17 with a preschool aged child, who were in a 
cohort randomly assigned at least 57 months before the survey.  The final report includes separate 
outcomes for ongoing recipients and applicants in three cohorts.  We wanted the applicant sample to have 
been exposed to the new program or AFDC for as long as the ongoing recipients.  Thus, we restricted the 
analysis to the earlier applicants.  This was not an issue for the four other states, as the surveys in the 
other evaluations were only administered to narrow cohorts of participants.  Also, in 1997, Iowa 
implemented TANF, and applied the new TANF policies to the control group.  Thus the treatment-control 
program differences are much smaller for later cohorts. 
21 In the MTO study, persons were randomly assigned to a treatment group (who was offered a housing 
voucher to move to a low poverty neighborhood) and a control group (no offer).  The need to examine 
intent to treat for MTO comes in because only a subset of persons in the treatment group accepted the 
offer.  Here, everyone has applied to obtain—and been deemed eligible for—welfare, although a small 
share of each group does not take up welfare. 
22 The exception to this is Iowa, where it is impossible to merge the administrative and survey information 
with the public-use data.  For Iowa, we have tried to match our survey sample as closely as possible. 
23 The difference between Connecticut and Florida reflects the fact that Connecticut had a much more 
generous earnings disregard.  Further, while the Connecticut time limit was a short 21 months, in practice, 
extensions to the time limit were fairly common.  Florida’s time limit was also relatively short (for the 
work-ready, 24 months out of 60) but more stringent than Connecticut’s while the survey in Florida was 
administered 4 years out.  
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24 In this and all subsequent figures, there is an appendix table with the same number that provides the 
supporting data and an alternative estimator. 
25 For example, many of these low-income children would be eligible for Medicaid via the poverty or 
OBRA expansions (children under about 15 in families with income up to 100% of poverty).  
26 The mother being at risk for depression is determined by her score being at least 16 (out of a possible 
60) on the 20-item Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale.  The child having behavioral 
problems is determined by whether the child’s Behavioral Problem Index score was in the worst 25 
percent.  General health is reported on a five-point scale:  excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. 
27 The Ns reported are less than the maximum possible N because an observation will be missing if it is 
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Figure 1
Impacts of Welfare Reform on Employment, Welfare, and Income from Experimental Studies, 
Outcomes Measured at the Quarter of Survey (Percent Effects)
A.  Quarterly employment
B.  Quarterly welfare participation
C.  Total quarterly income
Note:  The impacts are reported the outcomes at the quarter when the survey was conducted.  For CT-Jobs First, the survey 
was done 36 months after random assignment began; for VT-WRP, 42 months; for FL-FTP, 48 months; for MN-MFIP, 36 months; 
and for IA-FIP, 5-6 years. Effect sizes reported are the treatment-control difference divided by the control mean. Significance 
levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control differences.
IA-FIP
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients





MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients





MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
































- 2 0 - 1 00 1 02 03 04 0
Figure 2
Impacts of Welfare Reform on Employment, Welfare, and Income from Experimental Studies, 
Averages from Random Assignment to Quarter of Survey (Percent Effects)
A.  Quarterly employment
B.  Quarterly welfare participation
C.  Total quarterly income
Note:  The impacts are reported for quarterly averages from the time of random assignment through the quarter when the survey 
was conducted.  For CT-Jobs First, the survey was done 36 months after random assignment began; for VT-WRP, 42 months; 
for FL-FTP, 48 months; for MN-MFIP, 36 months; and for IA-FIP, 5-6 years (w e report the 6 year average). Effect sizes reported 
are the treatment-control difference divided by the control mean. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-
control differences.
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Figure 3
Impacts of Welfare Reform on Head’s Health Insurance from Experimental Studies (Percent Effects)
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
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Note:  The impacts are reported at the time of a follow-up survey administered to some recipients at some time after random 
assignment. For CT-Jobs First, the survey was done 36 months after random assignment began; for VT-WRP, 42 months; for 
FL-FTP, 48 months; for MN-MFIP, 36 months; and for IA-FIP, 5-6 years. Effect sizes reported are the treatment-control 
difference divided by the control mean. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control differences.
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Figure 4
Impacts of Welfare Reform on Child or Family Health Insurance from Experimental Studies 
(Percent Effects)
A.  Any child has public Insurance
IA-FIP
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients




B.  Any child has any 
insurance 
 IA-FIP
 MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients




C.  Any child ever without coverage 
 IA-FIP
 MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
 MN-MFIP, incentives-only, long-term recipients
***
***
Note:  The impacts are reported at the time of a follow-up survey administered to some recipients at some time after random 
assignment. For CT-Jobs First, the survey was done 36 months after random assignment began; for VT-WRP, 42 months; for FL
FTP, 48 months; for MN-MFIP, 36 months; and for IA-FIP, 5-6 years. Effect sizes reported are the treatment-control difference 
divided by the control mean. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%)  are for treatment-control differences.  Values for IA 
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Figure 5
Impacts of Welfare Reform on Child and Family Health Care Utilization, Access and Affordability of Care from 
Experimental Studies (Percent Effects)
A.  Focal child has seen dentist in past two years
IA-FIP
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
MN-MFIP, incentives-only, long-term recipients
FL-FTP
CT-Jobs First
B.  Focal child has seen doctor in past two years
IA-FIP
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
MN-MFIP, incentives-only, long-term recipients
FL-FTP
CT-Jobs First
C.  Focal child has place to go for routine care
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
MN-MFIP, incentives-only, long-term recipients
FL-FTP
CT- Jobs First
D.   Family not able to afford dentist
IA-FIP
IA-FIP
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients
MN-MFIP, incentives-only, long-term recipients
FL-FTP
CT-Jobs First
E.  Family not able to afford doctor
IA-FIP
MN-MFIP, full, long-term recipients





Note:  The impacts are reported at the time of a follow-up survey administered to some recipients at some time after random 
assignment. For CT-Jobs First, the survey was done 36 months after random assignment began; for VT-WRP, 42 months; for FL-
FTP, 48 months; for MN-MFIP, 36 months; and for IA-FIP, 5-6 years. Effect sizes reported are the treatment-control difference 
divided by the control mean. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control differences. Outcomes in 
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Figure 6
Impacts of Welfare Reform on Child and Mother Health Outcomes from Experimental Studies 
(Percent Effects)
A.  Focal child's mother at risk for depression
B.  Behavioral Problem Index top 25th 
til




Note: The impacts are reported at the time of a follow -up survey administered to some recipients at some time after random 
assignment. For CT-Jobs First, the survey was done 36 months after random assignment began; for VT-WRP, 42 months; 
for FL-FTP, 48 months; for MN-MFIP, 36 months; and for IA-FIP, 5-6 years. Effect sizes reported are the treatment-control 
difference divided by the control mean. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control differences.  
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Table 1: Policies in Welfare Reform Experiments and Preexisting AFDC Program 
  Connecticut 















General    Two tiered system 
based on job readiness 
Two tiered system for 
long term/short term 
recipients; Two 
treatments incentives 
only and full 
Control group subject 
to TANF rules in 97 
Two treatments: 
incentives only and full
(we only consider full 
treatment) 
 
Time Limit  21 months with 6 
months extensions 
 
24 months (of every 60)
for job ready; 36 (of 





None None None 
Work Requirements  Mandatory work first, 
exempt if child < 1 year
 
Mandatory job search 
& employment for job 
ready; education and 
training for others; 
exempt if child < 6 
months 
Mandatory employment 
and training for long 





training; exempt if child 
< 6 months (eliminated 
in 97) 
 
Half time work required 
after 30 months on aid 
Education/training; 
Exempt if child < 3 
years 




$200 + 50% of 
remaining earnings 
38% of earnings 
disregarded up to 140% 
of poverty; 
maximum grant 
increased by 20% if 
working 




st 4 months of work 
if “new worker” 
through 97) 
 
$150 + 25% of 
remaining earnings 
$120 + 33%:  Mo. 1–3 
$120:  Mo. 4–12 
$90:  Mo. > 12 
Financial Sanctions  Cut in grant for 1
st and 
2
nd offense; 3 mo. 
suspension for 3
rd 
Adult portion of grant 
eliminated until 
compliant (until 6/97) 
10% reduction in grant 
 
 
3 months reduced 





Selected other policies  Two years transitional 
Medicaid 
One year transitional 
Medicaid 
One year transitional 
Medicaid 
One year transitional 
Medicaid 
3 years transitional 
Medicaid 
One year transitional 
Medicaid 
Benefit level, family of 3 
at start of experiment 
$636 $303 $532 
 
$426 $640 N/A 
 
Sources: Dan Bloom et al., (2000); Bloom et al., (2002); Thomas Fraker et al., (2002); Gennetian et al., (2005) ; and Susan Scrivener et al., (2002).  
 
Table 2: Welfare Reform Experiments and Samples 
  Connecticut 
Jobs First (JF) 












Timing of Experiment 
RA:  random assignment 
FO:  follow-up 
RA:  1/96–2/97 
FO: 4 years  
RA:  5/94–2/95 
FO:  4 years 
RA:  4/94–3/96 (urban 
counties through Q3 1995) 
FO:  2–4 years (through 
6/98) 
RA:  9/93–3/96 
FO:  6–7 years 
RA:  6/94–12/96 
FO:  6 years  
Geographic range  Statewide waiver  
Evaluation in 2 offices  
 
Partial state waiver 
Evaluation in 1 county 
Partial state waiver 




Evaluation in 9 counties 
 
Statewide waiver 
Evaluation in 6 districts 
Sample Size for Evaluation  4,803 single parent cases 
 
2,815 single parent cases 
 
9,217 single parent cases, 
2,615 long term urban 
recipients 
 
7,823 single parent cases  5,469 single parent cases 
4,381 single parents for full 
WRP 
Timing of survey   Collected 3 years after RA 
to cohort entering 
experiment between 4/96 
and 2/97 
Collected 4 years after RA 
to cohort entering 
experiment between 8/94 
and 2/95 
Collected 3 years after RA 
to cohort entering 
experiment between 4/94 
and 10/94 
5–6 years after RA to 
cohorts entering before 4/96 
for recipients 
Collected 42 months after 
RA to cohort entering 
experiment between 10/94 
and 6/95 
Survey Response rate  80%    80% 80% 72% 80% 
Sample used in our analysis  All single parent cases  All single parent cases  Long-term single-parent 
recipients in incentives only 
urban group (on welfare at 
least 24 of past 36 months) 
N=1,769 
Long-term single-parent 




Single females 18 and older 
or 16–18 at RA with a pres-
school child  
N=1,996 
(Note:  survey sample as 
here  completing survey 
between 4 years 10 months 
to 5 years 11 months after 
RA) 
Full  WRP single parent 
cases 
N=4,381 
Maximum number of 
observations when using 
adult survey data  
2,424 1,729 718  (incentives  only) 
724 (full MFIP) 
1,201 842 
Maximum number of 
observations when using 
focal-child survey data 
1,469 1,108 573  (incentives  only) 
587 (full MFIP) 
683  NA (no focal child survey) 
 
Sources: Bloom et al., (2000); Bloom et al., (2002); Fraker et al., (2002); Gennetian et al., (2005); and Scrivener et al., (2002).  
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A.  Quarterly employment          
IA-FIP  NA          
MN-MFIP full  0.071*  0.040  0.50  0.50  14.13%  0.142  724 
MN-MFIP inc. Only  0.064  0.041  0.50  0.50  12.72%  0.128  718 
FL-FTP 0.009  0.024  0.54  0.50  1.69%  0.018  1,729 
VT-WRP 0.102***  0.034  0.53  0.50  19.28%  0.204  842 
CT-JF 0.050**  0.022  0.57  0.50  8.69%  0.100  2,414 
B.  Quarterly welfare receipt          
IA-FIP    NA          
MN-MFIP full   0.117***  0.040  0.56  0.50  20.97%  0.235  724 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.137***  0.039  0.56  0.50  24.65%  0.276  718 
FL-FTP -0.082***  0.017  0.20  0.40  -40.77%  -0.204  1,729 
VT-WRP -0.029  0.034  0.42  0.49  -6.86%  -0.058  842 
CT-JF -0.121***  0.021  0.40  0.49  -30.26%  -0.248  2,414 
C.  Average quarterly income         
IA-FIP    NA          
MN-MFIP full  337.97**  146.04  2616.34  1829.27  12.92%  0.185  724 
MN-MFIP inc. only  512.71***  158.42  2616.34  1829.27  19.60%  0.280  718 
FL-FTP    49.53  89.20  1799.48  1759.93  2.75%  0.028  1,729 
VT-WRP      2.26  129.79  2527.20  1869.25  0.09%  0.001  842 
CT-JF -144.57  107.24  2974.01  2384.00  -4.86%  -0.061  2,414 
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are average quarterly employment rates, averages for any 
cash welfare receipt during quarter (to be comparable to the employment rates), and average quarterly income (cash 
welfare plus food stamps plus general assistance (MN only) plus earnings) for the quarter during which the survey 
was done (except for IA where we do not report values because no quarterly number is available).  Statistics are for 
all observations completing the adult survey that also had data for all the outcomes.  Numbers are weighted to be 
representative of survey design where relevant.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Percent effect is 
100 times the treatment-control difference divided by control mean, effect size is treatment-control difference 
divided by control standard deviation. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control 
differences.  
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A.  Quarterly employment        
IA-FIP   0.033***  0.010  0.52  0.35  6.37%  0.095  7,823 
MN-MFIP full   0.132***  0.029  0.40  0.36  32.92%  0.372  724 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.065**  0.030  0.40  0.36  16.17%  0.183  718 
FL-FTP   0.058***  0.016  0.47  0.34  12.36%  0.169  1,729 
VT-WRP   0.043*  0.025  0.46  0.37  9.28%  0.116  842 
CT-JF   0.067***  0.017  0.51  0.38  13.16%  0.174  2,397 
B.  Quarterly cash welfare receipt         
IA-FIP   0.008  0.009  0.47  0.34  1.68%  0.023  7,823 
MN-MFIP full   0.091***  0.025  0.72  0.34  12.76%  0.270  724 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.127***  0.024  0.72  0.34  17.77%  0.376  718 
FL-FTP -0.044***  0.015  0.43  0.33  -10.20%  -0.133  1,729 
VT-WRP -0.006  0.025  0.61  0.36  -0.98%  -0.017  842 
CT-JF   0.029*  0.015  0.59  0.37  4.95%  0.079  2,397 
C.  Average quarterly income        
IA-FIP 83.23*  46.66  2215.24  1651.09  3.76%  0.050  7,823 
MN-MFIP full  366.82***  88.79  2443.30  1133.39  15.01%  0.324  724 
MN-MFIP inc. only  404.10***  97.66  2443.30  1133.39  16.54%  0.357  718 
FL-FTP 58.85  55.91  1750.35  1101.99  3.36%  0.053  1,729 
VT-WRP -2.84  72.42  2376.29  1030.16  -0.12%  -0.003  842 
CT-JF 209.93***  71.43  2658.18  1517.52  7.90%  0.138  2,397 
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are average quarterly employment rates, averages for any 
cash welfare receipt during quarter (to be comparable to the employment rates), and average quarterly income (cash 
welfare plus food stamps plus general assistance (MN only) plus earnings) for the period from random assignment to 
the quarter during which the survey was done (except for IA, when it is an average over the entire follow-up period).  
Statistics are for all observations completing the adult survey that also had data for the full period, except for Iowa, 
where they are for approximately the same cohorts as the survey data (the IA public use data does not contain the 
appropriate information to link the survey and administrative records).  Numbers are weighted to be representative 
of survey design where relevant.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Percent effect is 100 times the 
treatment-control difference divided by control mean (also shown in figure 1), effect size is treatment-control 
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A.  Public insurance         
IA-FIP   NA         
MN-MFIP full   0.072*  0.038  0.65  0.48  11.07%  0.152  712 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.058  0.038  0.65  0.48  8.93%  0.122  709 
FL-FTP -0.025  0.023  0.37  0.48  -6.77%  -0.052  1,725 
VT-WRP -0.012  0.032  0.70  0.46  -1.71%  -0.026  840 
CT-JF   0.099***  0.021  0.60  0.49  16.69%  0.203  2,418 
B.  Other nonpublic insurance (not public)       
IA-FIP    NA        
MN-MFIP full  -0.044  0.028  0.17  0.38  -25.77%  -0.117  707 
MN-MFIP inc. only  -0.029  0.028  0.17  0.38  -16.86%  -0.076  704 
FL-FTP   0.013  0.021  0.25  0.43  5.24%  0.030  1,723 
VT-WRP   0.011  0.024  0.14  0.35  7.84%  0.031  837 
CT-JF -0.055***  0.018  0.22  0.41  -25.23%  -0.133  2,402 
C.  Any insurance         
IA-FIP    NA        
MN-MFIP full   0.015  0.030  0.84  0.37  1.82%  0.042  708 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.016  0.030  0.84  0.37  1.96%  0.045  705 
FL-FTP -0.011  0.023  0.62  0.49  -1.78%  -0.023  1,723 
VT-WRP -0.006  0.025  0.84  0.37  -0.71%  -0.016  837 
CT-JF   0.046***  0.017  0.82  0.39  5.65%  0.119  2,403 
D.  Ever no insurance coverage        
IA-FIP   0.049  0.032  0.54  0.50  9.13%  0.098  1,190 
MN-MFIP full  -0.079**  0.039  0.39  0.49  -20.15%  -0.161  723 
MN-MFIP inc. only  -0.149***  0.037  0.39  0.49  -38.15%  -0.305  717 
FL-FTP   0.011  0.023  0.38  0.49  2.87%  0.023  1,729 
V T - W R P     N A          
C T - J F     N A          
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are survey estimates of insurance coverage for the recipient 
for month before survey, or of having had any spell of non-coverage since random assignment.  Statistics are for all 
observations completing the adult survey that had data for the outcome.  Numbers are weighted to be representative 
of survey design where relevant.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Percent effect is 100 times the 
treatment-control difference divided by control mean (also shown in figure 2), effect size is treatment-control 
difference divided by control standard deviation. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-
control differences.  
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A.  Public insurance         
IA-FIP   0.031  0.033  0.49  0.50  6.32%  0.062  1,106 
MN-MFIP full   0.045  0.036  0.72  0.45  6.34%  0.100  697 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.044  0.036  0.72  0.45  6.14%  0.097  696 
FL-FTP -0.037  0.026  0.61  0.49  -6.06%  -0.076  1,471 
VT-WRP -0.029  0.029  0.82  0.39  -3.58%  -0.076  774 
CT-JF   0.055***  0.019  0.78  0.42  7.14%  0.132  2,135 
B.  Any insurance          
IA-FIP   0.006  0.026  0.80  0.40  0.80%  0.016  1,105 
MN-MFIP full   0.017  0.027  0.86  0.34  1.97%  0.049  698 
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.008  0.029  0.86  0.34  0.90%  0.022  697 
FL-FTP -0.017  0.020  0.82  0.38  -2.07%  -0.045  1,468 
VT-WRP -0.013  0.022  0.90  0.30  -1.45%  -0.044  772 
CT-JF   0.005  0.010  0.95  0.22  0.57%  0.025  2,141 
C.  Any child ever without coverage        
IA-FIP   0.035  0.034  0.43  0.50  8.12%  0.071  1,004 
MN-MFIP full  -0.094**  0.038  0.35  0.48  -27.08%  -0.197  698 
MN-MFIP inc. only  -0.154***  0.036  0.35  0.48  -44.32%  -0.323  697 
F L - F T P     N A         
V T - W R P     N A          
C T - J F     N A          
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are survey estimates of insurance coverage for any child of 
the recipient for the month before survey, or of any child having had any spell of non-coverage since random 
assignment.  Statistics are for all observations completing the adult survey that had data for the outcome and had a 
child in their household at the time of the survey.  Numbers are weighted to be representative of survey design 
where relevant.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Percent effect is 100 times the treatment-control 
difference divided by control mean (also shown in figure 3), effect size is treatment-control difference divided by 
control standard deviation. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control differences.  
 
Appendix Table 5 
Impacts on Child and Family Health Care Utilization, Access and Affordability of Care, Survey Data 
  
Difference 












A. Focal child has seen dentist in past two years
IA-FIP -0.005 0.021 0.93 0.25 -0.54% -0.020 683
MN-MFIP full 0.022 0.025 0.89 0.31 2.47% 0.071 570
MN-MFIP inc.o nly 0.029 0.024 0.89 0.31 3.25% 0.094 558
FL-FTP -0.023 0.023 0.85 0.36 -2.68% -0.064 1,063
VT-WRP NA
CT-JF -0.013 0.012 0.96 0.21 -1.41% -0.065 1,459
B. Focal child has seen doctor in past two years
IA-FIP 0.004 0.014 0.97 0.17 0.40% 0.023 683
MN-MFIP full 0.008 0.018 0.95 0.22 0.79% 0.034 570
MN-MFIP inc.o nly 0.027* 0.016 0.95 0.22 2.83% 0.121 559
FL-FTP -0.012 0.011 0.97 0.16 -1.22% -0.072 1,065
VT-WRP NA
CT-JF 0.002 0.004 0.99 0.07 0.16% 0.021 1,461
C. Focal child has place to go for routine care
IA-FIP -0.021 0.015 0.97 0.17 -2.14% -0.123 682
MN-MFIP full 0.001 0.019 0.95 0.23 0.11% 0.005 570
MN-MFIPi nc.o nly 0.034* 0.016 0.95 0.23 3.59% 0.149 559
FL-FTP 0.004 0.018 0.90 0.30 0.41% 0.012 1,067
VT-WRP NA
CT-JF -0.004 0.006 0.99 0.11 -0.37% -0.035 1,460
D. Family not able to afford dentist
IA-FIP 0.009 0.031 0.17 0.37 5.62% 0.025 682
MN-MFIP full 0.010 0.033 0.20 0.40 5.19% 0.026 587
MN-MFIP inc.o nly -0.031 0.032 0.20 0.40 -16.01% -0.079 573
FL-FTP -0.007 0.029 0.35 0.48 -2.14% -0.016 1,107
VT-WRP NA
CT-JF -0.019 0.019 0.17 0.37 -11.51% -0.051 1,468
E. Family not able to afford doctor
IA-FIP -0.017 0.025 0.11 0.31 -15.68% -0.055 682
MN-MFIP full 0.009 0.028 0.13 0.33 7.14% 0.027 587
MN-MFIP inc.o nly -0.012 0.027 0.13 0.33 -9.11% -0.035 573
FL-FTP -0.014 0.025 0.22 0.42 -6.43% -0.035 1,107
VT-WRP NA
CT-JF  -0.014 0.017  0.12  0.33  -11.17%  -0.042  1,469 
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are survey estimates for the focal child of the recipient of having seen a doctor or dentist 
during the two years before the survey, for the focal child of the recipient for having a place to go for routine care, and for the focal child sample, 
whether the family had someone who could not see a doctor or dentist because they could not afford it during the last year.  Statistics are for all 
observations completing the focal child survey that had data for the outcome.  Numbers are weighted to be representative of survey design where 
relevant.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Percent effect is 100 times the treatment-control difference divided by control mean 
(also shown in figure 4), effect size is treatment-control difference divided by control standard deviation.  No focal child survey was completed in 
Vermont.  Focal child sample is children 5–12. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-control differences.  
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A. Focal child’s mother at risk for depression  
IA-FIP -0.012  0.038 0.30 0.46 -3.88%  -0.025 676
MN-MFIP full  -0.036  0.044 0.55 0.50 -6.51%  -0.072 525
MN-MFIP inc. only -0.112** 0.044 0.55 0.50 -20.27%  -0.226 507
FL-FTP -0.018  0.029 0.39 0.49 -4.70%  -0.038 1,091
VT-WRP   NA     
CT-JF   0.005  0.025 0.34 0.47 1.45%  0.010 1,436
B. Behavioral Problem Index in top 25th percentile  
IA-FIP -0.023  0.037 0.28 0.45 -8.27%  -0.052 683
MN-MFIP full  -0.038  0.040 0.30 0.46 -12.73%  -0.083 510
MN-MFIP inc. only -0.012  0.041 0.30 0.46 -4.13%  -0.027 493
FL-FTP   0.023  0.027 0.26 0.44 8.70%  0.052 1,100
VT-WRP   NA     
CT-JF -0.028  0.023 0.28 0.45 -9.92%  -0.063 1,450
C. Focal child has excellent or very good health   
IA-FIP -0.012  0.029 0.85 0.36 -1.39%  -0.033 683
MN-MFIP full  -0.029  0.036 0.78 0.42 -3.74%  -0.070 570
MN-MFIP inc. only   0.031  0.034 0.78 0.42 4.01%  0.075 559
FL-FTP   0.069***  0.026 0.73 0.45 9.43%  0.154 1,068
VT-WRP   NA     
CT-JF   0.033*  0.020 0.81 0.39 4.11%  0.086 1,466
 
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are survey estimates for the focal child of the recipient 
sample of whether the mother was at risk for depression (score of 16 or higher on 20-item Center for 
Epidemiological Studies-Depression scale (worst score was 60)), whether the focal child’s Behavioral Problem 
Index score was in the worst 25
th percentile, and whether the mother reported the child’s general health was 
excellent or very good.  Statistics are for all observations completing the focal child survey that had data for the 
outcome.  Numbers are weighted to be representative of survey design where relevant.  Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  Percent effect is 100 times the treatment-control difference divided by control mean (also shown 
in figure 5), effect size is treatment-control difference divided by control standard deviation.  No focal child survey 
was completed in Vermont.  Focal child sample is children 5–12. Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) 
are for treatment-control differences. 
  
 
Appendix Table 7 
Summary Measure Impacts on Adult, Child, and Family Measures, Survey Data 
  
Difference 






A.  Summary measure, employment, off welfare, and income, ave. since RA 
IA-FIP 0.041  0.020 0.181 7,823
MN-MFIP full  0.113  0.051 0.115 724
MN-MFIP 0.021 0.054 0.698 718
FL-FTP 0.110***  0.030 0.000 1,729
VT-WRP 0.046  0.048 0.671 842
CT-JF 0.078*  0.034 0.099 2,397
B.  Summary measure, head’s HI coverage 
IA-FIP -0.049  0.032 0.409 1,190
MN-MFIP full  0.070  0.059 0.551 707
MN-MFIP 0.118  0.059 0.125 704
FL-FTP -0.021  0.051 0.900 1,723
VT-WRP -0.007  0.038 0.849 837
CT-JF 0.060*  0.025 0.099 2,402
C.  Summary measure, child/family HI coverage
IA-FIP 0.001  0.050 0.993 1,105
MN-MFIP full  0.114  0.062 0.235 697
MN-MFIP 0.144 0.064 0.107 696
FL-FTP -0.066  0.053 0.489 1,468
VT-WRP -0.052  0.060 0.671 771
CT-JF 0.067  0.032 0.103 2,134
IA-FIP -0.013  0.045 0.993 681
D.  Summary measure, child/family utilization, access, and affordability
MN-MFIP full  0.015  0.058 0.857 570
MN-MFIP 0.117  0.055 0.123 558
FL-FTP -0.018  0.045 0.900 1,060
VT-WRP  NA  
CT-JF 0.006  0.024 0.801 1,453
E.  Summary measure, child/mother health 
IA-FIP 0.015  0.054 0.993 676
MN-MFIP full  0.030  0.062 0.857 509
MN-MFIP 0.120  0.062 0.125 492
FL-FTP 0.065  0.044 0.435 1,048
VT-WRP  NA  
CT-JF 0.051  0.036 0.263 1,421
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of public-use data.  Shown are survey estimates for summary measures for each state 
for each of the variables presented in figures 2–6.  Each summary measure is the average of the outcomes on each 
figure (normalized by each outcome’s control standard deviation), after converting each outcome to be positive 
when good (welfare participation is considered bad, but any kind of HI good).  For the figure 2 summary measure,  
 
the sample is adults completing the survey with non-missing administrative data (for IA only, it is instead the same 
cohort as the survey).  For the figure 3 summary measure, the sample is adults completing the survey with non-
missing HI data.  For the figure 4 summary measure, the sample is adults with a child in the HH at the time of the 
survey completing the survey with non-missing child/family HI coverage data.  For the figures 5 and 6 summary 
measures, the sample is survey recipients with a focal child completing the survey, with non-missing data on health 
care utilization, access, and affordability or health outcomes, respectively.  Numbers are weighted to be 
representative of survey design where relevant.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Difference is 
treatment control difference in each summary measure.  FWE adjusted p-value is p-value for comparison in row, 
adjusted for joint testing across all summary measures in the state.  No focal child survey was completed in 
Vermont.  Focal child sample is children 5–12.  Significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%) are for treatment-
control differences, adjusted for family-wise errors. 